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economic decisions depend, directly or indirectly,
on the predictability of monetary policy. Monetary
policy decisions can create surprises that affect
outcomes from household decisions as to what
jobs to take and where to live. Similarly, business
firms find that their decisions on hiring and invest-
ment in physical capital may turn out well or
poorly depending on the course of monetary
policy and its effects on the economy.
If you follow the financial press at all, or
watch national TV news following a Fed policy
decision, you know that financial markets have
an intense interest in what the Federal Reserve
does or does not do. Financial market behavior
provides an opportunity to study the predictabil-
ity of monetary policy with some precision. That
is my topic today, organized around my title
theme: How Predictable Is Fed Policy?
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Robert Rasche, senior vice president and
director of research, provided special assistance.




Since 1989, the FOMC has adopted many prac-
tices that improve the transparency of its policy
actions. Enhanced transparency is important for
improving the Fed’s political accountability, but
from an economic perspective transparency is
D
ay in and day out, all of us depend
on a high degree of predictability in
the nation’s monetary arrangements.
Consider, for example, the counter-
feiting problem. The problem is in fact small
enough that we rarely examine our paper money
closely. Through careful design of the currency,
and careful monitoring and enforcement, the
Treasury and Federal Reserve together maintain
a highly reliable currency—its usefulness to us
is almost completely predictable.
Historically, the least predictable aspect of
our monetary system has been monetary policy.
Monetary policy mistakes led to the Great
Depression of the 1930s and the Great Inflation
of the 1960s and 1970s. Unpredictability can have
high costs. The Great Inflation and its correction
led to the failure of hundreds of savings and loan
associations (S&Ls). The problem was that S&Ls
made long-term mortgage loans at interest rates
reflecting expectations of modest inflation, but
those expectations proved to be too low again and
again as inflation rose after 1965. As inflation rose,
interest rates on outstanding long-term fixed-rate
mortgages did not, creating enormous losses for
S&Ls. Later, as inflation expectations became
embedded, many borrowed at interest rates that
turned out to be unsustainably high; purchases of
farmland, for example, financed at high interest
rates turned out to be extremely unwise as infla-
tion fell unexpectedly in the early 1980s. Many
farmers and agricultural banks that lent to them
failed.
Inflation predictability is the most obvious,
and probably most important, consequence of
predictable monetary policy. Nevertheless, mostessential if markets are to understand Fed policy
and therefore be more successful in predicting
policy adjustments. Fed policy is implemented
through decisions by the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) that set the target, or
“intended,” federal funds rate. The funds rate is
the interest rate in the interbank market on over-
night (one-day) loans. The funds rate is the ful-
crum, or anchor, for all other interest rates in the
market.
Here are some milestones of changes in FOMC
practices that have enhanced transparency:
• August 1989: Policy changes in the target
federal funds rate are limited to multiples
of 25 basis points. Prior practice of changing
the rate in other increments often created
market uncertainty as to exactly what the
Federal Reserve’s intention was.
• February 1994: Starting with this FOMC
meeting, the Committee released a press
statement describing its policy action at
the conclusion of any meeting at which
the Committee changed the target funds
rate. Prior to this practice, the market had
to infer from Fed open market operations
whether, and how, the Fed’s policy stance
had changed. Consequently, the market was
often uncertain as to the current setting of
Fed policy.
• August 1997: Public acknowledgment that
policy is formulated in terms of a target for
the funds rate. The market had come to
believe that the federal funds rate was the
policy target but all uncertainty about this
issue disappeared after this time.
• August 1997: A quantitative target federal
funds rate is included in the Directive to
the System Open Market Account Manager
at the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (the “Desk”). Previously,
the Fed often discussed policy in terms of
the “degree of pressure on reserve posi-
tions” in the money market. A clear focus on
a quantitative target ended the ambiguity.
• May 1999: A press statement following
the conclusion of every FOMC meeting
includes the target federal funds rate and
the policy “bias.” The bias indicated that
the Committee was leaning toward an
increase or decrease in the funds rate target
but had not yet decided to actually change
the target.
• December 1999: In its press statement, the
FOMC replaces the policy bias language
with “balance of risks” language in an effort
to lengthen the horizon of its statement and
provide a summary view of its outlook for
the economy.
• January 2002: The vote on the Directive
and the names of dissenting members, if
any, are included in the press statement.
Previously, this information was not avail-
able to the market until the meeting minutes
were released following the subsequent
FOMC meeting, six to eight weeks later.
• August 2003: The FOMC introduces
“forward-looking” language into its post-
meeting press statement.1 This language
suggested the probable direction of the
target federal funds rate over the next one
or more meetings.
• January 2005: Release of minutes of FOMC
meeting advanced to three weeks after the
meeting (and before the next scheduled
FOMC meeting).
The purpose of these changes, which have
gone a long way toward lifting the traditional veil
of secrecy over monetary policy, is to increase
transparency of policy, improve accountability,
and provide better information to market partici-
pants about the future direction of policy. In
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1 “In these circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.” Federal Reserve
Press Release, August 12, 2003 (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2003/ 20030812/). In the press release of January 28, 2004,
the language was modified: “…the Committee believes that it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation” (www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/20040128/default.htm ). Subsequently, in the press release of May 4, 2004, a second modification of the
language was introduced: “the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured”
(www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/20040504/).several earlier speeches and papers written jointly
with members of the St. Louis Fed Research
Division, I examined how changes in Fed trans-
parency have affected market behavior, especially
after 1994. Today, I will review some of those find-
ings and add new findings on market behavior
over the past two years, when the most recent
innovations were introduced.2
ARE MARKETS IN SYNCH WITH
THE FOMC?
On a number of occasions I have stressed
my view of the importance of markets being “in
synch” with the FOMC. Accumulating evidence
has shown that, judging by the reaction of the
federal funds futures market, market participants
have been increasingly accurate in predicting
FOMC policy actions as steps toward more trans-
parency were implemented. The basic theme of
this work is that the economy will function more
efficiently if the markets and the Fed are interpret-
ing incoming data the same way. If the Fed and
the markets have the same view as to the policy
implications of new information, then the market
will be able to predict Fed policy adjustments
accurately.
Those analyses were made prior to the intro-
duction of “forward-looking” language in the post-
FOMC meeting press releases, beginning in
August 2003. An appropriate question is how the
“forward-looking” language has affected market
perceptions of future FOMC policy actions.
Figures 1 and 2 replicate and extend the corre-
sponding figures from Poole and Rasche (2003;
see footnote 2).
First, a little background. The federal funds
market trades continuously during the day and
the rate may fluctuate minute by minute. At the
conclusion of each day, the Fed publishes the
“effective” rate, which is the rate at which most
transactions took place. Also trading continuously
during the day, on the Chicago Board of Trade,
are futures contracts in federal funds. The matur-
ing futures contract is settled at the end of the
month based on the average effective federal funds
rate during the month. Thus, the federal funds
futures market is a direct bet on the FOMC’s target
federal funds rate in the future. The number of
contracts traded has changed over time, as has
the level of trading activity in the market.
Over the course of a month, data become
known and the market trading is based on that
information plus expectations as to the federal
funds rate during the remaining days of the month.
There is also trading in the 1-month-ahead con-
tract—for example, in October 2005, trading in a
November 2005 contract. The Chicago Board of
Trade lists additional contracts as far as a year or
more out, but trading volume is trivial much
beyond the 5-month-ahead contract. The distant
contracts, because they tend to have thin volume,
are not necessarily reliable measures of market
expectations of the federal funds rate in the future.
However, the 1-month-ahead contract is pretty
active and provides an excellent measure of market
expectations for that month. In my analysis, I will
focus on the 1-month-ahead contract and certain
other contracts, such as the 4-month-ahead con-
tract—for example, in October 2005, the contract
for February 2006.
Now look at Figure 1. The period covered
starts when trading in federal funds futures com-
menced in October 1988. The data shown are daily
changes (close-of-business to close-of-business)
in the yield on the 1-month-ahead federal funds
futures contract on days of scheduled FOMC
meetings and days when the FOMC changed the
target funds rate between regular meetings. The
area shaded in gray, between plus and minus 5
basis points, indicates a region that I have defined
as insignificant “noise” in this market.
In Figure 1, the points plotted with a square
show days on which the FOMC changed the target
federal funds rate by 25 basis points. For example,
the second dark blue square from the left shows
that on that day the 1-month-ahead futures con-
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2 For a review of the effect of the earlier improvements in FOMC transparency see W. Poole and R. H. Rasche, “The Impact of Changes in FOMC
Disclosure Practices on the Transparency of Monetary Policy: Are Markets and the FOMC Better ‘Synched’?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review, January/February 2003, 85(1), pp. 1-9.tract rose by about 0.12 percentage points, or 12
basis points. Thus, on that day, the market had
predicted about half of the actual change of 25
basis points in the target funds rate. Looking far-
ther to the right in Figure 1, you can see that most
of the dark blue squares fall within the gray band.
That means that on days of scheduled FOMC
meetings, most of the time the market correctly
predicted the Committee’s action of changing the
target funds rate by 25 basis points. Remember
that the data show the market’s trading the day
of the FOMC meeting. The Committee’s decision
is not generally predicted accurately weeks or
months in advance.
Also in Figure 1, points plotted with a dark
blue triangle indicate days of scheduled meetings
when the FOMC changed the target funds rate by
50 basis points. There is one point, November 15,
1994, plotted with a dark blue diamond, showing
the single case in which the FOMC changed the
target rate by 75 basis points. If you look care-
fully at the dark blue triangles, you can see that
the futures market did a pretty good job of predict-
ing changes of 50 basis points. The largest error,
in 2002, was about –0.18, or 18 basis points. One
way of interpreting that error is that the market
was betting on a decline in the target rate of 25
basis points and putting some probability on a
decline of 50 basis points. Looking at all the dark
blue points, the market has done a pretty good
job of predicting rate changes, especially after
February 1994.
Now look at the light blue points in Figure 1.
These show days on which the FOMC took policy
actions between regularly scheduled meetings.
As with the dark blue points, squares indicate
federal funds target changes of 25 basis points
and triangles indicate changes of 50 basis points.
Although there are few light blue points after































Lt Blue: Intermeeting target changes
Dk Blue: Target changes at scheduled meetings
8/89: All subsequent
changes in multiples of
25 basis points.
2/94: All subsequent changes accompanied by
press statement at end of FOMC meeting. → →
Figure 1
Changes in Funds Futures Rate When FOMC Changed Target Funds Rate
NOTE: ￿ 25-basis-point change, ￿ 50-basis-point change, ￿ 75-basis-point change, ￿ change
that market was not immediately aware had occurred (Poole, Rasche, and Thornton, 2002).February 1994, it is clear that FOMC policy actions
on days other than scheduled meetings are not
well predicted. That result is hardly surprising,
given that such meetings are not announced in
advance. The very existence of such a meeting,
as well as the change in the target funds rate,
necessarily takes the market by surprise.
Figure 2 shows days when the FOMC met and
made a policy decision not to change the target
federal funds rate. As can be seen in the figure,
there were times before 1998 when the market
put some probability on a rate change, and when
the FOMC did not change the funds rate target
that meant that the futures market adjusted to
reflect that outcome. However, most of the time
the points fall in the gray band, meaning that the
futures market did not change by much because
the market had correctly predicted that the FOMC
would not change the target rate.
We can summarize these results as follows:
Particularly since February 1994, policy decisions
taken at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings,
whether or not they’ve involved a federal funds
target change, have generated little if any news
in the federal funds futures market. Such decisions
have been well anticipated by market participants.
As you have been looking at Figures 1 and 2
you have probably wondered why the points at
the end of the period, starting with August 2003,
fall almost precisely on zero, indicating no error
at all in predicting FOMC decisions. Starting with
the statement issued after its meeting of August 12,
2003, the FOMC has included “forward-looking”
language that has facilitated nearly perfect market
forecasts of the FOMC decision at its next meeting.
Initially, the language indicated that “policy
accommodation can be maintained for a consid-
erable period.” That language suggested that the
FOMC would not change the target funds rate at
its next meeting. After the meeting of January 28,
2004, the language was modified to say that “the
Committee believes that it can be patient in remov-
ing its policy accommodation.” The market read
that language as suggesting that the period of an
unchanged target funds rate was coming to an end,
but was not yet over.






























2/94: All subsequent changes accompanied by
press statement at end of FOMC meeting. →
Figure 2
Changes in Funds Futures Rate on FOMC Meeting Dates With No Change to Target Funds RateFinally, the statement issued after its meeting
of May 4, 2004, said that “the Committee believes
that policy accommodation can be removed at a
pace that is likely to be measured.” That language
then appeared in every statement through the
most recent statement issued after the meeting
on September 20, 2005. The market came to read
the language as indicating that the FOMC would
raise the target funds rate by 25 basis points at
its following meeting. The FOMC in fact did so
at every meeting through the most recent one,
and the market prediction errors were negligible.
In particular, none of the policy actions taken since
the introduction of this language—that policy
accommodation can be removed at a measured
pace—has generated any large (greater than 5
basis points) change in the yield on the 1-month-
ahead funds futures contract on the day of the
FOMC action. On each of these occasions the
futures market has made an almost perfect forecast
of the 25-basis-point increase in the target funds
rate.
Bob Rasche and I, in our earlier work, found
that the futures market, although predicting FOMC
decisions quite accurately a day in advance, usu-
ally did not predict accurately several months in
advance. But now we have a new question to
explore: If the content of the FOMC press releases
since August 2003 is signaling the policy decision
at the next FOMC meeting so clearly, how well are
markets now predicting the more distant trajectory
of the target federal funds rate?
Addressing this question is a bit more compli-
cated than it might seem. The FOMC and market
participants understand that monetary policy
cannot be locked down long in advance because
an unpredictable economic event might make a
policy adjustment highly desirable. Since June
2004, the press release has clearly indicated that,
while the Committee intends to proceed at a meas-
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Figure 3
Changes in Funds Futures Rate When FOMC Changed Target Funds Rateured pace, its intention is conditioned on future
information about the state of the economy.3 A
second question concerns the information that is
generating adjustments of market expectations.
On the vertical axis of Figure 3 are changes
in the futures yield for the contract of the month
subsequent to the next FOMC meeting. These
changes are plotted on the date when an FOMC
policy action was announced. Because there are
eight scheduled meetings per year, sometimes
there are meetings in adjacent months and some-
times not, which means that the futures contract
studied is sometimes two months ahead and some-
times three months ahead. An example may help
in understanding what data were used. In the case
of the meeting on May 15, 2001, the market knew
that there was a scheduled meeting on June 26-27,
2001. Thus, here we examined the change on
May 15 in the July 2001 futures contract—the 2-
month-ahead contract. However, the next sched-
uled meeting following the one on June 26-27, was
on August 21; there was no meeting scheduled
for July. Thus, the relevant change in the federal
funds futures market on June 27 was for the
September 2001 contract—the 3-month-ahead
contract.
In Figure 3, on the horizontal axis are changes
in the yield on the 1-month-ahead futures con-
tract, and on the vertical axis are changes in the
appropriate 2- or 3-month-ahead contract as just
explained. The points plotted in dark blue are
for the period from the beginning of 1999 through
June 2003. During this period, yields on the two
futures contracts essentially moved one-for-one
as indicated by the tight scatter of the points
around the 45-degree line. That is, if the 1-month-
ahead contract changed by 30 basis points, so also
did the appropriate 2- or 3-month-ahead contract.
The points plotted in light blue are from the suc-
cession of 25-basis-point moves during the period
of the “measured pace” language. All but one of
these points fall into the gray box that designates
changes of less than 5 basis points in absolute
value. Hence the changes in the target funds rate
during the measured pace regime have generally
not been surprises, nor have they generated revi-
sions to market expectations of the policy action
at the immediate future FOMC meeting.
If we examine all the daily data, and not just
data for days of FOMC meetings, from the begin-
ning of July 2003 through mid-September 2005,
there were only two days when the yield on the
1-month-ahead funds futures contract changed
by 5 basis points or more. Those two days were
June 15, 2004, and September 1, 2005. On the
first of these days Chairman Greenspan testified
at the hearings for his renomination as Chairman
of the Board of Governors. On that day the July
2004 futures yield decreased by 5 basis points. On
the other day, September 1, 2005, the October
2005 futures yield decreased by 6 basis points in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Thus, since
July 2003 there is simply not much information
in the 1-month-ahead contract on how market
expectations are reacting to news. This finding is
in sharp contrast to earlier Poole-Rasche findings,
which I do not have time to discuss in any detail
here, that economic news such as employment
reports often triggered significant changes in the
1-month-ahead futures contract.
However, over the past two years, the 4-month-
ahead futures contract is more informative.
Between June 2003 and mid-September 2005
there were 24 occasions when the yield on this
contract changed by 5 or more basis points. One
was the occasion of the announcement of a 25-
basis-point increase in the target funds rate on
June 30, 2004. On that date the yield on the
October 2004 funds futures contract decreased
by 8 basis points. At first glance this market reac-
tion might suggest some confusion about FOMC
intentions.
In fact, two pieces of information became
available with the FOMC press release on that
day. First, the increase of 25 basis points in the
target funds rate was the initial policy action
under the forward-looking language of removing
policy accommodation “at a pace that is likely to
be measured.” On the previous day, the October
2004 funds futures contract had closed at 1.90.
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3 “Nonetheless, the Committee will respond to changes in economic prospects as needed to fulfill its obligation to maintain price stability.”
Federal Reserve Press Release, June 30, 2004 (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/ 20040630/default.htm).Since there were only two scheduled FOMC meet-
ings during the July-October 2004 period, this
yield implied a market expectation of a cumulative
75-basis-point move and roughly a 0.6 probability
of an additional 25-basis-point move over three
FOMC meetings in June through September. The
August and September futures contract yields
were quite consistent. The August contract yield
implied a probability of about 0.4 of a 50-basis-
point move at the August FOMC meeting condi-
tional upon a 25-basis-point increase at the June
meeting. The September contract yield implied a
probability of about 0.5 of a 50-basis-point move
at the September FOMC meeting conditional upon
a 25-basis-point increase at both the June and
August FOMC meetings.
The revelation of a 25-basis-point move at the
June 2004 meeting solidified market impressions
that “measured pace” meant a succession of 25-
basis-point increases in the target funds rate. At
the close of trading after the June 30 policy action,
the October futures yield of 1.83 implied two
additional increases of 25 basis points through
September, but only about a 0.3 probability of a
move larger than 50 basis points during that
period. Consistently, after the announcement,
the probability of a 50-basis-point move at the
August FOMC meeting implied by the August
contract fell to around 0.25. The probability of a
50-basis-point move at the September FOMC
meeting implied by the September contract, con-
ditional on a 25-basis-point move in August, also
fell to around 0.25.
The other information that became available
in the June 2004 press release was introduction
of the qualification to the measured pace language
that “the Committee will respond to changes in
economic prospects as needed to fulfill its obli-
gation to maintain price stability.” On July 2, 2004,
the initial estimate of payroll employment growth
for June 2004 was only 112,000 new jobs, com-
pared with survey predictions on the order of
250,000. After this news, a second large downward
adjustment to the October futures yield occurred,
reducing the expectation of any policy action in
excess of 25 basis points at either of the next two











–400 –300 –200 –100 0 1002 003 004 00
Four-Month-Ahead Yield Change (basis points)
Actual Payroll Employment Minus Survey Predicted Change
Dk Blue: January 1999–June 2003
Lt Blue: August 2003–September 2005
Figure 4
Large 4-Month-Ahead Funds Futures Changes and Employment SurprisesFOMC meetings to zero. The yields on the August
and September contracts also implied approxi-
mately zero probability of anything other than
25-basis-point moves at the two forthcoming
FOMC meetings.
Of the remaining 23 “large changes” since
June 2003, 12 (52 percent) occurred on days when
the employment data were released. Three “large
changes” occurred in the immediate aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina (August 30–September 1, 2005.)
Eight changes occurred on days when economic
data were released, but in none of these cases were
there multiple releases of any single statistical
series.4 Hence, since the introduction of “forward-
looking” language, market expectations appear
to have reacted systematically only to employment
data.
Are the observed market reactions suggestive
that markets expect a systematic reaction by the
FOMC to employment data? Economic theory and
ample empirical investigation in many markets
indicate that the appropriate concept is the
employment surprise, measured by the difference
between the initial estimate of the change in pay-
roll employment and survey predictions of the
employment change. Figure 4 presents a scatter
plot of changes in the yield on the 4-month-ahead
futures contract and employment surprises. The
12 points plotted in light blue indicate the futures
market reaction to the employment prediction
errors. Since I consider only “large changes” in
the futures yield, there are no observations in
the gray shaded area of 5 basis points.
With one exception, all of the light blue points
fall in the first and third quadrants of the graph
and are roughly consistent with a linear relation-
ship between the changes in the futures yield
and the employment survey prediction error.
Apparently, market expectations of the future
level of the funds rate since the FOMC introduced
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Figure 5
Small 4-Month-Ahead Funds Futures Changes and Employment Surprises
4 The releases that occurred on these eight dates were wholesale inventories (9-Jun-04), retail sales (14-Jun-04), CPI (15-Jun-04), personal
income (28-Jun-04), industrial production (15-Apr-05), leading indicators (21-Apr-05), ISM (6-Sep-05), and productivity (7-Sep-05).“forward-looking” language into the press release
are adjusted in the same direction as the employ-
ment surprise. This finding is consistent with an
understanding that the short-run strategy of the
FOMC involves adjustments in the future path of
the target funds rate when incoming data suggest
that the risks to employment growth have changed.
The points plotted in dark blue in Figure 4
indicate “large changes” in the 4-month-ahead
fund futures rate on days that the payroll employ-
ment data were released between January 1999
and the introduction of “forward-looking” lan-
guage in August 2003. There are 19 such events
of a total of 131 “large change” events during this
period (15 percent). Again almost all of the points
lie in the first and third quadrants of the graph.
Also, there does not appear to be any systematic
difference between the scatters of points before
and after mid-2003. Thus, at the horizon of the
4-month-ahead futures contract, the adjustment
of market expectations to news about payroll
employment does not appear to have been sys-
tematically influenced by the introduction of
“forward-looking” language in the press release.
To complete the analysis, it is necessary to
examine the nature of market reactions to employ-
ment surprises on those dates when the release
of the employment statistics was not accompanied
by large changes in the yield on the 4-month-ahead
funds futures contract. These data are shown in
Figure 5. As before, the points in light blue are
for the period since the introduction of “forward-
looking” language in August 2003. The points
in dark blue are from January 1999 through mid-
2003. In contrast to Figure 3, the difference
between the data from the past two years and the
earlier period is startling. In the recent period, all
of the small changes in the futures yield occurred
when the employment forecast was highly accu-
rate. Hence, during this period there is a clear
distinction in the response of the futures yield to
the employment data: When there are large
employment surprises the futures rate adjusts;
when there are no surprises (or very small sur-
prises) there is little movement in the futures yield.
However, in the period from 1999 through mid-
2003 there were many occasions when employ-
ment surprises did not generate any appreciable
reaction in the funds futures yield.
My conclusion from these observations is
that market sentiment has coalesced around the
view that news about employment growth is a
significant influence on the path of the target funds
rate in the foreseeable future.
I’ll finish with two observations. First, my
emphasis on market reactions to employment
surprises does not mean that the market ignores
inflation. What has happened in recent years is
that core inflation—inflation excluding effects
of food and energy—simply has not generated
significant surprises. The Fed has emphasized
that it focuses on core inflation so that monetary
policy does not react to energy and food prices,
which tend to be highly volatile. I have no doubt
that both the FOMC and the market would respond
to surprises in core inflation that seemed likely
to be persistent and to indicate a developing
inflation problem.
Second, recent changes in the federal funds
futures rate in response to rapidly changing
events connected with hurricanes Katrina and
Rita will be interesting to examine carefully in
the future. However, these events are too recent
to be good candidates for careful analysis now,
and I’ll forgo an effort at instant analysis.
CONCLUSION
The federal funds futures market, and other
markets I have not discussed here, provide a rich
source of information to better understand the
effectiveness of the Fed’s changes in disclosure
policies over the Greenspan era. It is quite clear
that the markets understand Fed policy to a much
greater extent than before. My own view is that
the market’s improved understanding, and the
Fed’s efforts to improve clarity of monetary policy
decisions and decision processes, have much to
do with the economy’s improved stability. Reces-
sions have become milder, and core inflation more
stable. Maintaining these gains is important to
economic welfare. I would not claim that we have
enough evidence to say that the gains are perma-
nent, but we do have enough to say that the effort
has been very productive.
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